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Introduction
In his 1989 work, The Other Path1 and in his recently published The
Mystery of Capital,2 Hernando de Soto argues that the key to development
lies not in the pursuit of any classic economic variable, such as the expansion of savings, 3 the influx of foreign capital, 4 entrepreneurial know-how, 5
or the introduction of technology. 6 Instead, he claims that "most of the
poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of capitalism,"
whether they be natural, economic, or human, and that achieving economic growth simply requires unleashing these assets' true potential. 7
Specifically, de Soto sees developing nations' prime hindrance as the
lack of clearly delineated property rights. 8 He maintains that without them
1. Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World
(1989) [hereinafter The Other Path].
2. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the
West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000) [hereinafter The Mystery of Capital].
3. See id. at 5. De Soto states "[elven in the poorest countries, the poor save. The
value of savings among the poor is, in fact, immense-forty times all the foreign aid
received throughout the world since 1945." Id.
4. See id. at 3. De Soto maintains "[foreign investment is, of course, a very good
thing. The more of it, the better... Yet we continually forget that global capitalism has
been tried before. In Latin America, for example, reforms directed at creating capitalist
systems have been tried at least four times since independence from Spain in the 1820s.
Each time, after the initial euphoria, Latin Americans swung back from capitalist and
market economy policies. These remedies are clearly not enough. Indeed, they fall so
far short as to be almost irrelevant." Id.
5. See id. at 4. In particular, de Soto claims "[t]he cities of the Third World and the
former communist countries are teeming with entrepreneurs. You cannot walk through
a Middle Eastern market, hike up to a Latin American village, or climb into a taxicab in
Moscow without someone trying to make a deal with you. The inhabitants of these
countries possess talent, enthusiasm, and an astonishing ability to wring a profit out of
practically nothing." Id.
6. See id. "They can grasp and use modern technology. Otherwise, American businesses would not be struggling to control the unauthorized use of their patents abroad,
nor would the U.S. government be striving so desperately to keep modern weapons out
of the hands of Third World countries." Id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. See id. at 6. "Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of
narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against investment." Id.
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"the poor lack easy access to the property mechanisms that could legally
fix the economic potential of their assets so that they could be used to
produce, secure, or guarantee greater value in the expanded market." 9 In
fact, de Soto believes so ardently in the power of a legal regime to pattern
and, in turn, stimulate an economy, that he claims "[a]n appropriate system of property rights, contracts, and extracontractual liability can spontaneously generate the efficient use of resources without a bureaucracy to
decide or authorize how the resources must be used."'1
While de Soto presents a compelling argument, and provides a daunting amount of statistical evidence to support his proposition," the question remains: Can we really assume that the formalization of property
rights will solve underdevelopment - a complex problem that has endured
for centuries? Developmental economists have long championed the
notion that the key to progress can be found in one factor of development,
arguing that if this key factor can be correctly aligned and exploited, development will quickly follow. 1 2 The multitude of these one-factor theories,

however, has failed to spawn a durable theory of development. Should we
now consider de Soto's proposal as being fundamentally different from the
scores of one-factor theories that have come before it? While de Soto's premise that property rights further economic expansion through more efficient use of property, is a basic component to development, can it really be
considered the preeminent component?
In this note, I agree with de Soto's proposition that formalizing property rights is often a crucial step in furthering development. I take issue,
however, with how he has positioned these rights in the scheme of development and the relative importance he has accorded them. In particular, I
attempt to show how de Soto raises the same question posed by classical
growth models dating back to the 1930s and 1940s. Ultimately, I believe
that de Soto's reliance upon traditional developmental economic models
limits his work, as he neglects to address numerous questions that are crucial to enacting his program. Specifically, when should a developing
nation formalize property rights, to what extent should these property
rights should be formalized, who should be entrusted with the property
rights and who should relinquish them, and how quickly the process of
formalization should proceed.
In an attempt to address, at least in part, some of these questions, Part
II places de Soto's writings in the broader context of developmental economics, demonstrating how his writings frame development questions in a
strikingly similar fashion to those of classical developmental economic theorists such as Roy Harrod and Evsey D. Domar, with the crucial difference
9.
10.
11.
works,

Id. at 48.
See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 184.
While de Soto includes both statistical and anecdotal evidence throughout his
see generally Chapter 5, The Costs and Importance of the Law, in DE SOTO, THE

OTHER PATH,

supra note 1. In this chapter, he carefully shows how the inefficiency of

many countries' bureaucracy has fostered the growth of an informal economy.
12. For a further discussion of one-factor theories see infra.
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resting in how de Soto proclaims to have "solved" the problem of
expanding capital and savings in traditional models. Part III suggests an
alternative approach to the consideration of formalizing of property rights.
This approach draws from the writings of Albert 0. Hirschman, arguing
that property rights are only one of many factors in development, and that
careful attention must be given to the sequencing of these factors to compel
development. Finally, Parts IV through IX apply this alternative approach
to numerous developmental factors, attempting to demonstrate how development must be carefully patterned if growth is to be achieved.
I.

Property Rights and Classical Theories of Developmental
Economics

De Soto's failure to progress beyond simply proclaiming the need for
property rights can be attributed to the emphasis he places on the project
of formalizing property rights. 13 In particular, by presenting the formalization of property rights as decisive for steady, uninterrupted growth, 14 de
Soto simplifies the process of development, ignoring the complex interplay
between property rights and numerous other developmental factors. 15
In this sense, the design of de Soto's theory greatly resembles that of
classical developmental theorists, who similarly pegged a nation's aggregate development to the development of one decisive factor. To illustrate
these earlier theories, it is worth considering the Harrod-Domar model,
which initiated modern interest in growth theory, both framing its discussion and launching countless related studies. 16 Simply put, the HarrodDomar model holds that "growth depends only on the capital-output ratio
and on the availability of capital as determined by the propensity to save
13. See DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 184. At one point, de Soto even
goes so far as to state that "[a]n appropriate system of property rights, contracts, and
extracontractual liability can spontaneously generate the efficient use of resources without a bureaucracy to decide or authorize how the resources must be used." Id.
14. See id. at 178. "[T]he economic importance of property rights is not that they
provide assets which benefit their holders exclusively, but that they give their owners
sufficient incentive to add value to their resources by investing, innovating, or pooling
them productively for the prosperity and progress of the entire community." Id. "Basically, what property rights, contracts, and extracontractual liability do is reduce uncertainty for people who want to invest their labor or capital in the development of existing
resources." Id. at 180.
15. See Moses Abramovitz, Economic Growth, in 2 A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY EcoNOMICS 132-182 (Bernard F. Haley ed., 1952). While there are many factors crucial to
the process of development, some of the most prominent include the supply of labor, the
supply of land, the supply of capital, qualitative attributes of the population, business
organization, the legal and political framework, and the discovery and dissemination of
knowledge.
16. See generally R.F. Harrod, An Essay in Dynamic Theory, 49 EcoN. J., 14, 14-33
(1939); see also Evsey Domar, Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment, 14
ECONOMETRICA 137, 137-47 (1946). I have chosen not to burden this note with a
lengthy presentation of how Harrod and Domar derived their growth formulas. Those
readers interested in learning more about Harrod and Domar's economic models should
review these articles, as they serve as a powerful overview of their basic premises.
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In many respects, de Soto, too, has adopted the boundaries of the Harrod-Domar model. What has sparked the current interest in de Soto's project, however, is how he diverges from these earlier classical theories.
Whereas classical theorists such as Harrod and Domar were ardent proponents of international aid programs, championing the creation of new
9
wealth through infusing foreign capital,' de Soto espouses turning away
from foreign aid programs and foreign direct investment toward realizing a
nation's already existing wealth. 20 The significance of de Soto's theory
cannot be understated, as it purports to have "solved" the Harrod-Domar
theory's incessant need for capital, thereby reviving it and all its promise of
steady and spontaneous growth. It is the manner by which de Soto shifts
the locus of growth from attracting foreign capital and increasing national
savings 2 1 to the capitalizing of existing savings in the form of informal
property 22 that has captured the attention of international media, policy
makers, and aid organizations,as it embodies a radical turn from traditional development programs.
Despite his innovative twist, however, de Soto's reliance on traditional
developmental models ensures that his own theory will draw in all the
23
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17. Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays 56
(1986) [hereinafter Rival Views].
18. See generally Growth Economics (Amartya Sen ed., 1970); see also Y.S. Brenner,
Theories of Economic Development and Growth 175-222 (1966).
19. See generally Growth Economics, supra note 18; see also Brenner, supra note 18,
at 175-222. The Harrod-Domar, Solow-Swan-Tobin and Kaldor-Robinson models were
particularly powerful early proponents of the need for foreign capital.
20. See de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, supra note 2, at 3-5.
21. See Harrod, supra note 16, at 14-33; see also Domar, supra note 16, at 137-47.
22. See de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, supra note 2, at 5. Again, de Soto specifically writes that "most of the poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of capitalism. Even in the poorest countries, the poor save." Id. at 5.
23. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4 (1958)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]. In commenting on prevailing developmental economics theories, Hirschman notes that "whenever any theory was propounded that considered a given value system a prerequisiteof development, it could usually be effectively
contradicted on empirical grounds: development had actually taken place somewhere
without the benefit of the 'prerequisite."' Id.
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An Alternate Approach to Classical Theories of Developmental
Economics

De Soto's study could escape an oversimplification of the problem of
development by utilizing a more nuanced approach that not only considers
a broader range of factors in development, but also the influence property
rights have over other factors of development and vice versa. Such an
approach can be found in Hirschman's work on sequencing, which was
first set forth in his 1958 study The Strategy of Economic Development.24
Much like de Soto, Hirschman contends "development depends not so
much on finding optimal combinations for given resources and factors of
production as on calling forth and enlisting for development purposes
resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized. '2 5
Unlike de Soto, however, Hirschman does not look to one factor to "call
forth and enlist" existing resources and abilities, but rather to how a variety of factors interact, searching, in particular, for factors that function as
inducing and mobilizing mechanisms, 26 which thereby compel the development of other factors. 27 Hirschman maintains that, given developing
nations' need to prioritize their investments (and development projects
generally), those factors that compel the development of other factors
should be pursued first.28 He explains that
[tihe resulting 'strategy of unbalanced growth' values investment decisions
not only because of their immediate contribution to output, but because of
the larger or smaller impulse such decisions are likely to impart to further
investment, that is, because of their linkages. The strategy has important
implications for investment planning: it proposes that dynamic considerations, based on the linkages, should be allowed to complement the criterion
29
of static efficiency.
Hirschman further expanded his concept of linkages 30 by considering
differences between backward linkages 3 1 (where further investment flows
backwards from finished goods to semiprocessed or raw goods), forward
24. See id.
25. See HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 17, at 56.
26. See id. at 74. "The linkage concept, in short, invites the analyst to pay close
attention to the differential technological and situational features of economic activities
as a means of detecting how 'one thing leads (or fails to lead) to another."' Id.
27. See Abramovitz, supra note 15, at 132-82.
28. See HIRsCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 76-79.

29. See

HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS,

supra note 17 at 56-57.

30. See id. at 56-74. This chapter entitled "Linkages in Economic Development"
provides the most concise and powerful statement of linkages and can, in some ways, be
considered a reformulation of the conception Hirschman originally put forth in THE
STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23.
31. See id. at 57. "[An] existing industrial operation-relying initially on imports
not only for its equipment and machinery, but also for many of its material inputswould make for some pressure toward the domestic manufacture of these inputs and
eventually would also provide a market for a domestic capital goods industry. This
dynamic I called a backward linkage, since the direction of the stimulus toward further
investment flows from the finished article back to the semiprocessed or raw materials
from which it is made or to the machines which help make it." Id.
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linkages 3 2 (where further investment flows forward from a finished good
33
towards other independent finished goods), consumption linkages

(where domestic production of consumer goods carried out as newly
earned income is spent on such goods), and fiscal linkages 34 (where
export taxes and tariffs can be used to finance investment projects). He
linkages he did not intend to exclude
also noted that by presenting these
35
the existence of other linkages.
Finally, when reassessing his work on linkages and sequencing,
Hirschman noted the dangers that can threaten to destroy linkages' power

to compel their predicate and thereby prevent progress; a problem he
referred to as "getting-stuck."'3 6

Significantly, he noted that some

sequences are inherently not self-propelling, but rather strewn with resistance. That is to say, whereas the first steps are easy to take by themselves,
these first steps can make it difficult to take further steps, as the initiating
of some sequences actually involves building resistance towards realizing
their predicates. 3 7 This is especially true, Hirschman argues, when an

existing reform is likely to be placed in jeopardy by a proposed reform

(what he terms the "Jeopardy Thesis") 38 or when there is a general unwill39
ingness to put the status quo at risk.
III.

Linkages between Property Rights and Other Factors of

Development
When one applies Hirschman's conception of factors as sequences of
linkages to formalizing property rights, it removes the issue from abstrac32. See id. "Another stimulus toward additional investment points in the other direction and I therefore called it a forward linkage: the existence of a given product line A,
which is a final demand good or is used as an input in line B, acts as stimulant to the
establishment of another line C which can also use A as an input." Id.
33. See id. at 64. "The mechanisms of the new linkages were more roundabout than
the backward and forward variety. Thus consumption linkage is defined as the stimulus
toward domestic production of consumer goods that will be undertaken as newly
earned incomes are spent on such goods. In an open economy such goods will often be
imported at first, but eventually domestic production will become an attractive proposition." Id.
34. See id. at 67. "[Niew activities can also be established by the state as it interferes
with such market forces. The state can tap the flow of income accruing to the exporters
through various forms of export taxes, or it can impose tariffs on the imported articles
on which a good part of the new export-related incomes will be spent. The resulting
fiscal receipts can then be used, among other things, to finance public or publicly supported investment projects. These sequences spell out a new class offiscal linkages." Id.
35. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, A PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 74 (1995).
36. Id. "IL]eisurely, sequential problem-solving is not necessarily a pure blessing, as
has been so plausibly argued in the literature on political development. Sequential problem-solving brings with it the risk of getting stuck." Id. at 74.
37. See HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 17 at 57. Here Hirschman notes, for
example, that established industrialists tend to resist backward linkages due to their
preference to continue to rely on imports of a certain predictable price and quality.
38. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 81-132 (1991).
39. See HIRSCHMAN, PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION, supra note 35, at 51-56. He
cites, in particular, Veblen's conception of the "penalty of the early start."
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tion, allowing a consideration not only of the significance of formal property rights in and of themselves, but also of their significance in inducing
other factors of development.
Some of the most significant factors of development readily linked to
de Soto's conception of the formation of property rights - factors worth
considering in greater detail - include issues of national politics, national
economics, national culture, the national legal system, and globalization.
IV.

The Linkage between Property Rights and National Politics

While de Soto recognizes the linkage between the formalizing of property rights and national politics, he fails to discuss the extent or sequence
of their relationship. After stating, for example, that a "property revolution
[is] always a political victory, ''40 he never addresses whether a particular
political climate will facilitate a property revolution or whether a property
revolution will itself induce political change.
A.

Property Rights and Ruling Regimes

Significantly, while it is implicitly suggested by his writings, 4 1 de Soto
never explicitly acknowledges the way property represents real political
power in many situations, and that fundamental changes to property
regimes often result in struggles for power. As Galbraith notes, for example, "a land reform is a revolutionary step; it passes power, property, and
status from one group in the community to another. If the government of
the country is dominated or strongly influenced by the landholding
groups. . . no one should expect effective land legislation as an act of
grace. ''42 While there are, to be sure, many situations short of revolution
where those in power have enacted fundamental changes to property
rights, such reform is usually prompted by a specific national condition,
such as rural unrest, ideological commitment, international climate, or
43
population pressure.

Within the turbulent political scenes of many developing nations,
however, perhaps the most important and common condition prompting
property rights reform is the newly-formed political regimes' search for
40. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 106.
41. See Mario Vargas Llosa, Foreward to DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at
xiv. Notably, de Soto begins THE OTHER PATH with numerous statements maintaining
that the poor's lack of political power has driven them to illegality. He states "when
legality is a privilege available only to those with political and economic power, those
excluded-the poor-have no alternative but illegality." Id. at xvii. Similarly, Llosa
observes that de Soto views the rich as having taken little or no interest .n increasing the
poor's position in society, claiming that "instead of favoring the production of new
wealth, the system, owned, in effect, by the closed circle of those who benefit from it,
discourages any such effort and prefers merely to re-circulate the ever-diminishing
amount of capital." Id. at xvii.
42. John K. Galbraith, Conditions of Economic Change in Under-Developed Countries,
33 J. OF FARM EcON. 689, 695-96 (1951).
43. See

(1974).

HUNG-CHAO TAI, LAND REFORM AND POLITICS:

A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

51
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legitimacy, which seeks the maintenance and strengthening of their position against other political factions through an appeal to the public. 4 4 In
this sense, many property reforms are not the acknowledgement of societal
changes, but rather political maneuvers carried out in the interest of a specific group of political elites. 4 5 Unfortunately, de Soto ignores the political
implications of inter-factional power struggles and the role that extra-political groups, such as the military, have played in the development of liberalized markets and democracy in many nations. 46 One need only consider
the example of Pinochet's Chile to understand the importance of this
47
oversight.
Furthermore, de Soto fails to address the importance of political transitions in developing nations, ignoring their potential to completely uproot
existing patterns of ownership. Amy Chua aptly illustrates this danger in
her recent article The Privatization-NationalizationCycle, 48 where she demonstrates that the current trend of privatization is far from intractable or
irreversible, as Latin American and Asian nations have oscillated between
privatizing and nationalizing property throughout the twentieth century
largely as a consequence of forces such as ethnic nationalism. 4 9
B. Property Rights and Political Participation
An equally challenging issue is the possible political effects that formalizing property rights may have upon the political participation of a
nation's poor. While de Soto 50 (and many others) 5 1 concentrates simply
on the question of aggregate economic growth, believing that it will alleviate other social problems, evidence suggests just the opposite. In Irma
Adelman and Cynthia Morris' landmark study Economic Growth and Social
Equity in Developing Countries, they found that "economic growth itself not
only tends to be accompanied by actual declines in political participation
44. See id. at 56.
45. See id.
46. See generallyJuAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION

(1996). The volume demonstrates, in particular, the importance of

the role the military in Argentina (191-94), Brazil (168), Chile (208), and Uruguay
(153-56).
47. See id. at 205-18.
48. Amy Chua, The Privatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between Markets
and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995).
49. See generally id.
50. See e.g., DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 198. In fact, much of de
Soto's critique can be understood as a reaction to state attempts towards achieving
greater wealth distribution at the expense of greater economic growth. In his own
words, De Soto claims, "[o]ur legal system, then, does not seek to establish the regulations needed to safeguard and delimit rights and obligations protecting everyone's property and encouraging everyone's transactions, for it does not reflect a desire to create
wealth-producing institutions but, rather, an obsession with the direct administration of
daily occurrences." Id.

51. See generally GROWTH
175-222.

ECONOMICS,

supra note 18;

BRENNER,

supra note 18, at

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 37

52
but is one of the prime causes of income inequality.
Curiously, while de Soto continuously argues in terms of a nation's
aggregate resources, he never addresses exactly how these resources will be
distributed or how the formalizing of property rights may effect this distribution. 53 While it may seem intuitive that formalizing property rights will
serve as a means of fragmenting political and economic power, de Soto
never confronts the fact that formalizing property rights also makes those
rights alienable. When taken together with his call for expanded capital
markets, this fact could simply allow for those already possessing political
and economic advantage to leverage their power and achieve greater con54
centrations of property rights, further exacerbating social inequalities.
Therefore, although de Soto acknowledges that "[elconomic freedom is the
counterpart of political freedom, and only when the two are united-two
sides of a single coin-can they really function,"15 5 he has failed to show
why formalizing property rights will safeguard either.

C.

Property Rights and Demographics

Finally, when discussing the massive migrations from rural areas to
urban centers throughout the developing world, de Soto argues "migration... is hardly an irrational act," and that it "has little to do with 'herd
instinct." 5 6 While evidence, in fact, supports de Soto's assertion, this evidence is in itself problematic, underscoring the general problem many
developing nations' poor have in acquiring any form of property rights to
57
land and housing.
In part, these migrations have been the public's logical response to
ever-increasing concentrations of wealth and power in the developing
world's urban centers, and their consequent promise of higher wages and
better living conditions. 58 While it is true that real wages are often higher
in most cities than in the countryside 59 and that cities offer lower infant
MORRis, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN
2 (1973).
53. See Llosa, supra note 41, at xvii. Although de Soto fails to address questions of
distribution directly, Llosa describes de Soto's analysis in Chapter 5 of THE OTHER PATH,
52.

IRMA ADELMAN & CYNTHIA

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

when he states that "instead of favoring the production of new wealth, the system,
owned, in effect, by the closed circle of those who benefit from it, discourages any such
effort and prefers merely to recirculate the ever-diminishing amount of capital." Id.
54. See Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW
183, 214-20 (1995). Hendrix' article provides an excellent survey of the practical difficulties involved in formalizing property rights in the developing world (and in particular
Central America).
55. Llosa, supra note 41, at xx.
56.

See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 81.

57. See generally Hendrix, supra note 54.
58. See generally HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23.
59. See THE MEGA-CITY IN LATIN AMERICA 12-13 (Alan Gilbert ed., 1996). It should
be noted, however, that there is great social inequality within developing nations' cities,
as the poor often pushed to slums located on the outer margins of cities and generally
have vastly inferior terms of employment.
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mortality rates and higher average life-spans, 60 these advantages often
come at the price of further dependency upon those elites who actually
possess wealth. In this sense, while it is true that a significant number of
migrants to the cities are able to claim an informal, expectative property
right over an area of land, exactly in the manner de Soto describes, 6 1 the
majority of migrants (and often the majority of a city's inhabitants), never
able to secure any form of autonomous property right, be it formal or informal, are forced to live in run-down tenement houses. 62 Brazil's coriti~os
provide a vivid example of the strength of this trend towards profiteering,
in the housing market for the poor, as a response to the population pressures that have made inner-city tenements highly profitable. 63 In 1981, for
example, the Folha de Sao Paulo reported that "over 80 percent of the older
houses and mansions in the central part of SAo Paulo have been converted
into tenements. Between 9 and 22 families live in most of these tenements,
'6 4
5 people to a room, which is rarely bigger than 4 square meters."
The migrants' plight has only been further exacerbated by real estate
agents who, as a form of land speculation, have stimulated urban expansion at cities' periphery. 6 5 With a ready supply of buyers searching to free
themselves of exorbitant rents and gain the security and prestige of owning
their own houses, many lower and middle class individuals have been willing to pay a premium for deeds and titles. 6 6 In Brazil, brokers (loteadores)
have seized upon this opportunity not only by selling false deeds and titles,
but also through strategically capitalizing on subdivided tracts of land sold
piecemeal, these sales net higher prices due solely to former purchasers'
60. See generally THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA
411-13 (2001). In fact demographic pressures have increased so drastically as a result
of population growth that governments in Mexico and Brazil have promoted programs to
lower birth rates, despite opposition from groups such as the Catholic Church.
61. See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 23-26. Outlines a more complete
discussion of de Soto's conception of expectative property rights.
62. See SOCIAL

STRUGGLES AND

THE CITY: THE CASE OF SAO PAULO

74-75 (Lucio

Kowarick ed., 1994). The author notes that "[t]he following description of working-class
living conditions is as valid today as it was in 1980," and then proceeds to cite a newspaper article from the November 24, 1980 edition of Folha de Sao Paulo, which states:
"Living for the most part in unfit quarters with cracked walls, crumbling plaster,
obstructed plumbing, cramped damp rooms, often lacking windows, teeming with rats
and roaches, and constantly at the mercy of unscrupulous landlords, this significant
part of the population [residing in tenements], which promises to grow considerably,
never received help from those with political power. . .The health of residents also
declined. The incidence of tuberculosis and other common illnesses as well as anemia
and psychological problems augmented. People are eating worse and health problems
tend to become more serious. Moreover, since the buildings in which they live are
neither maintained nor repaired, they are in a constant state of deterioration." Id. at
74-75.
63. See id. at 72. In fact, the author claims that in the absence of inflated rents, the
income generated from apartments would amount to only about one-quarter of that
currently collected.
64. Id.
65. See

MODERN BRAzIL: NEW PATTERNS AND DEVELOPMENT

ed., 1971).
66. See id.

275-77 (John Saunders
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improvements to the property. 6 7 These settlements generally fail not only
due to their lack of perfect title, but also due to the fact that the brokers
have made no provision for the extension of basic utilities into the areas
68
(including electricity, sewage, and water systems).
Furthermore, as Hirschman notes, the rationale behind the migration
69
can be "traced to the problem of property rights in the countryside.
This, in turn, raises the question of why de Soto does not address the failures of agrarian reform, a solution that gained particular weight in the
1960s and 1970s. 70 If land reform in rural areas failed, why should formalizing property rights largely in urban areas - areas which possess infinitely greater possibilities of harboring conflicting claims - be expected to
fare any better? Additionally, if individuals were able to leverage their
property toward creating capital, would not this capital be best applied in
the context of labor-intensive industries - industries such as agriculture
that generally make poor use of urban lands?
While, in many ways, the Latin American migration to the cities is
irreversible, 7 1 rural lands nonetheless pose a far more defensible solution
to distributing property rights, as rural lands are not only more plentiful,
but also generally do not require dispossessing their formal owners to the
same degree. These questions, namely how a nation is to decide between
existing formal claims (however weak they may be) and informal claims
(however strong they may be) and what compensation formal landlords
should be given for their dispossessed lands, are of immense importance.
In fact, leaving them without any clear solution could quickly undermine
the legitimacy provided through the social contract that de Soto believes is
72
so vital to the success of any property rights regime.
D.

Sequencing Property Rights and National Politics

These observations suggest that favorable national politics precede
formalizing property rights in a forward linkage; albeit a very weak one, as
it is unclear to what extent favorable national politics compel the formalizing of property rights. The linkage is particularly difficult to assess in the
context of development due to many nations' relative political instability
and the profound implications that political change carries for the maintenance of property rights regimes.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id.
See HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 9.
See generally AGRARIAN PROBLEMS AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS

IN LATIN AMERICA

(Rodolfo Stavenhagen ed., 1970) [hereinafter AGRARIAN PROBLEMS].
71. See generally THE MEGA-CITY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 59; see also LATIN AMERICAN URBANIZATION: HISTORICAL PROFILES OF MAJOR CITIES (Gerald Michael Greenfield ed.,
1994). Both books trace the rise of urbanization in Latin America, demonstrating how
Latin American cities can be expected to increase in size in the future.
72. See RUSSELL KING, LAND REFORM: A WORLD SURVEY 67-68 (1977).
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Sequencing Property Rights

The Linkage between Formalizing Property Rights and National
Culture

While de Soto acknowledges, at least implicitly, 7 3 the existence of a
variety of linkages between the formalizing of property rights and other
factors in development, he expressly rejects the importance of any linkage
between formalizing property rights and national culture, maintaining that
"[t]he disparity of wealth between the West and the rest of the world is far
74
too great to be explained by culture alone."

A.

Cultural Conceptions of Property

When discussing property, de Soto conflates differences between
national cultures, arguing simply that "people are prepared to think similarly about property rights in very similar ways. '' 75 This assertion is difficult enough to maintain when considering seemingly related cultures such
as those of the United States and Europe. 76 One need only consider the
drastically different standings given to property within the U.S. 7 7 and German constitutions 78 for an example of how seemingly similar cultures do,
in fact, diverge in how they conceive property. 79 When this assertion is
stretched further still, taking into account African and Asian societies, it
appears completely untenable. Consider, for example, the manner in
which Daniel Etounga-Manguelle 8 o has noted how African thought largely
rejects any view of the individual as an autonomous and responsible being,
and that consequently, many African tribes continue to maintain property
regimes based upon communal ownership, which stresses the needs of the
community over those of the individual. 8 1
73. See generally DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2. In fact, the thrust
of this book is the interconnection between property rights and capital, and specifically
how, by formalizing property rights, capital will be unleashed as a direct consequent.
74. See id. at 4.
75. See id. at 179.
76. See Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The
German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003).
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Commonly referred to as the Takings Clause, stating
"nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
78. Grundgesetz GG art. 14 (F.R.G.). As translated in DAVID. P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 349 (1994). "(1) Property and right of
inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be determined by statute. (2)
Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal. (3) The taking of
property is permissible only for the public weal. It may be effected only by or pursuant
to a statute regulating the nature and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall
be determined by establishing an equitable balance between public interest and the
interests of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation,
recourse may be had to those courts of ordinary jurisdiction." Id.
79. For a thorough comparison of the differences in constitutional standing afforded
to property under American and German law, see Alexander, supra note 76.
80. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a CulturalAdjustment Program?, in
CULTURE MATrERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 71-72 (Lawrence Harrison &
Samuel Huntington eds., 2000).
81. See id.
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B. Tendencies Towards Informality and Formality
Furthermore, when de Soto argues that "the choice between working
formally and informally is not the inevitable result of people's individual
traits but, rather, of their rational evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of entering existing legal systems,"8 2 he fails to realize that any costbenefit analysis necessarily incorporates preferences, which themselves are
largely derived from culture. In this sense, all major determinants of culture, from education to religion, have an impact on individuals'
preferences.
C.

Examples from History

Additionally, in drawing examples from world history, in an attempt
to illustrate that all property regimes were first codified informally and
then legitimized by governments through an incorporation into national
law, de Soto ignores crucial differences in the history of developing and
developed nations. How can the formation of property rights in modernday Peru be considered the same as the formation of property rights in the
United States (where property rights developed along with westward
expansion into vast, open tracts of land) or England (where property rights
developed slowly over centuries)? While de Soto's historical examples do
underscore the role that property rights can play in development, they
hardly offer any insight in terms of how a developing nation should go
83
about implementing such rights within their borders.
One need only consider de Soto's own writings to discover the limits
of his attempt to compare developing nations' current situation with that of
the early history of the United States.8 4 Notably, the process of formalizing property rights in the United States, as chronicled by de Soto, occurred
at the frontier or in other sparsely populated tracts of land and was sanctioned, at least in part, due to the prevailing interests the government (who
85
had legal claim to the frontier lands) had in ensuring their cultivation.
How can de Soto compare sprawling metropolitan areas such as modern
day Mexico City with early 19th century U.S. territories? In fact, given the
peculiarities of the early history of many former colonies', would it even be
fair to consider them on the same general track as the United States? De
Soto ignores, for example, basic distinctions between settlement and
expansion in the United States onto lands owned by the government and
82. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 185.
83. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2 at 150-51. Generally, de

Soto freely discusses historical examples as illustrative of the process of formalizing
property rights, yet makes no attempt to proscribe how such a process can be undertaken in the present day. Ultimately, de Soto himself realizes the challenge of adapting
such historical examples to the present day, when he states that "this is not to say that
developing and former communist nations should slavishly imitate the U.S. transition.
There are plenty of negative consequences in the U.S. experience that they should be
careful to avoid." 1d. at 150.
84. For a general introduction to the subject, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF
BRiTisH NORTH AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION (1986).
85. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 109-10.
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settlement and expansion in countries such as Brazil onto lands that had
been entrusted to a few wealthy individuals (in an effort to encourage colonization, the Portuguese divided Brazil into fourteen land grants to Portuguese nobles during the years 1534 to 1536, allowing the grantees
complete dominion over their grants-an act that entrenched a system of
86
concentrated land ownership).
D.

Unique Paths of Development

Ultimately, one is left asking why de Soto chooses to argue against the
many thinkers who have linked development to the inherent uniqueness of
a given nation. Weber, for example, identified "beliefs, attitudes, value systems, climates of opinion, and propensities which they have found to exert
a favorable influence on the generation of enterprise and of developmental
initiative."'8 7 When forecasting how the continent would industrialize,
Marx concluded that Germany and other nations would follow a somewhat different path due to their national history and legal traditions.8 8
Why then does de Soto ignore issues of culture? One could argue that
countries often fail to take advantage of their development potential not
because of political or economic policies, but "because, for reasons largely
related to their image of change, they find it difficult to take the decisions
needed for development in the required number and at the required
speed."8 9 In the end, it seems far more realistic to conclude that uniform
solutions to development simply lead one away from considering the roots
of problems of development. Therefore, one should remember that efficient sequences are likely to vary widely from region to region, and that
they must be constructed by incorporating all the peculiarities of the culture that they are being designed to serve. 90
E.

Sequencing Property Rights and National Culture

These observations suggest that national culture precedes formalizing
property rights in a forward linkage. Again, however, there is no evidence
that culture will compel the formalizing of property rights, bringing into
question the force of this linkage.
VI.

The Linkage between Formalizing Property Rights and National
Economics

In basing the thrust of his work on the linkage between property
rights and the formation of capital, de Soto generally ignores several other
key economic linkages. Most notably, he fails to adequately address how
86. See THOMAS F. SKIDMORE, BRAZIL: FIVE CENTURIES OF CHANGE 10-11 (1999).

87.

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 2

(1978) (1968).
88.

HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note

89. Id. at 25.
90. See id. at 83.

23.
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formalizing property rights may effect either the distribution of existing
wealth or the creation of further wealth.
A.

Distribution of Wealth

The closest de Soto comes to discussing distribution is in his criticism
of the behavior of entrepreneurs acting within the system:"[i]nstead of
favoring the production of new wealth, the system, owned, in effect, by the
closed circle of those who benefit from it, discourages any such effort and
prefers merely to recirculate an ever-diminishing amount of capital." 9 1 De
Soto argues that "[a] legal system whose sole purpose is redistribution thus
benefits neither the rich nor the poor, but only those best organized to
establish close ties with the people in power. ''9 2 Without question, de Soto
opposes government efforts to instill equality, citing their frequent failures
in the past. 93 The question remains, however, as to just how much economic inequality can be tolerated before it hampers aggregate economic
growth. This is a question well worth answering for many Latin American
countries such as Brazil, where wealth disparity has only accelerated since
the 1960s 94 and governmental efforts to improve housing through the
National Housing Bank (BNH) have generally helped only the middle and
upper classes (both directly, through actual investment in their residences,
and indirectly, through their involvement with the construction
95
industry).
B.

Balanced Growth vs. Unbalanced Growth

De Soto also fails to clarify the pace at which he believes the formalizing of property rights should be conducted. The closest he comes to giving
an answer lies in the Mystery of Capital,where he states that "[tihe lesson
of the West is that piecemeal solutions and stopgap measures to alleviate
poverty were not enough. Living standards rose only when governments
reformed the law and the property system to facilitate the division of
labor." 96 In this passage, he considers that reform must be effected both
swiftly and completely, seemingly espousing, therefore, that growth must
be balanced. 9 7 Yet, as Hirschman notes, "balanced growth theory reaches
the conclusion that an entirely new, self-contained modern industrial
economy must be superimposed on the stagnant and equally self-contained traditional sector," posing a problem in that "its application requires
huge amounts of precisely those abilities which we have identified as likely
to be in very limited supply in underdeveloped countries." 98 Hirschman
91. Llosa, supra note 41, at xvii.
92. Id. at 191.
93. See id.
94. See SKIDMORE, supra note 86, at 183.
95. See SocIAL STRUGGLES AND THE CITY, supra note 62, at 122-23.
96. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 75.

97. By balanced, I mean that growth will be linear, always progressing and never
retreating. I do not mean to imply any timeframe for growth in calling it balancedbalanced growth may happen instantaneously or over decades.
98. HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 52-53.
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therefore maintains, "if a country were ready to apply the doctrine of balanced growth, then it would not be underdeveloped in the first place." 99
While the process of registering informal rights would certainly take some
time, making it appear that de Soto is not arguing for such a drastic push, it
would be wrong to label this time lag the equivalent of an unbalanced
growth approach.
C.

Maximizing Wealth

Furthermore, de Soto believes that there is a linkage between formalizing property rights and maximizing the aggregate wealth of a nation. Specifically, he claims that "[clontrary to the belief widespread in Latin
America, the economic importance of property rights is not that they provide assets which benefit their holders exclusively, but that they give their
owners sufficient incentive to add value to their resources by investing,
innovating, or pooling them productively for the prosperity and progress of
the entire community." 10 0 While de Soto's statement is based largely on
the proposition that property rights often serve to incorporate externalities
into ownership and thereby benefit the community at large, de Soto unduly
extends the idea that property rights benefit the community by maintaining that private owners exploit their property in the public's interest. This
is certainly not the case in Latin American, where property owners have
routinely hoarded the wealth yielded by their property.101 One need only
turn to examples of the fazendas and haciendas throughout Latin America
(whose progression from systems of slavery to state coercion to the current
system of contracting labor from landless or land-poor peasants in a
buyer's market) to see how thoroughly, in fact, some owners have exploited
their property in their own self-interest. 102
Furthermore, the idea that increased income leads to increased investment, while supported by economic theory, has not always been the reality
in Latin America, where wealthy property owners have exhibited a clear
liquidity-preference over investment, thereby "keeping themselves and their
funds uncommitted or 'liquid' so as to take advantage of the unusual
10 3
opportunity whenever it comes."'
D.

Capital Formation

Finally, de Soto's linkage between formalizing property rights and the
formation of capital, the crux of his work, while incredibly powerful, is not,
in itself, conclusive. While, de Soto looks to employ the six effects that he
feels have allowed the West to produce capital (including: fixing the economic potential of assets; integrating dispersed information into one system; making people accountable; making assets fungible; networking
99. Id. at 53-54.
100.

DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH,

supra note 1, at 178.

101. See generally SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 60.
102. See AGRARIAN PROBLEMS, supra note 70, at 17.
103.

HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 21.
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people; protecting transactions), 1 04 he never proves that capital is, in fact,
what is lacking in developing countries. One need only consider how little
has been accomplished through injecting foreign capital into developing
economies to see the importance of this question. Additionally, as Wolf
and Sufrin note, a shortage of capital is seldom found to hinder projects
that have been carefully planned and promise to be competently
5
managed.

E.

10

Sequencing Property Rights and National Economics

These observations suggest that formalizing property rights will precede capital formation, indicating that a strong forward linkage will exist,
as individuals are induced to act upon property rights to maximize the
value of their assets. No conclusive remarks can be made concerning how
property rights will effect wealth distribution and wealth maximization,
however, as there is evidence to support conflicting conclusions.10 6
VII.

The Linkage between Formalizing Property Rights and National
Legal Systems

The closest de Soto comes to explicitly considering linkages can be
found in his treatment of the relationship between property rights and
national legal systems and, in particular, in his discussion of the formal
and informal sectors.
A.

The Growth of Informality

Far from attributing the growth of informality to an attempt to evade
the law, de Soto holds that informality arises out of the failure of a formal
legal regime to adequately represent and enforce the populous' conceptions
of justice and fairness. 10 7 He claims that "informal activities burgeon
when the legal system imposes rules that exceed the socially accepted legal
framework - does not honor the expectations, choices, and preferences of
those whom it does not admit within its framework - and when the state
does not have sufficient coercive authority." 10 8
De Soto argues that the only feasible way that governments can correct
the legal regime's failure to secure property rights is through acknowledging the informal rights that he claims already exist.' 0 9 Arguing against the
104. See
105. See

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 47-62.
CHARLES WOLF & SIDNEY C. SUFRIN, CAPITAL FORMATION AND FOREIGN INVEST-

MENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

11-29 (1955).

106. See Llosa, supra note 41, at xviii.
107. See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 6. Specifically, de Soto cites "[t]he
inefficiency of the law courts has given rise to a growing disenchantment with, and loss
of confidence in, law-enforcement mechanisms." In turn, he claims this disenchantment
leads to "[a] complete subversion of means and ends has turned the life of Peruvian
society upside down, to the point that there are acts which, although officially criminal,
are no longer condemned by the collective consciousness." Id. at 5-6.
108.

DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH,

109. See

supra note 1, at 12.

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL,

supra note 2, at 172-82.
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state's imposition of mandatory laws that he believes are often created de
novo, de Soto appeals to authorities to simply enter communities and formalize existing patterns of land use, whether it be plainly evident uses,
such as the cultivating of crops, or tacitly acknowledged through community recognition. 1 10 De Soto explains this process when he mandates that
"what governments in developing countries have to do is listen to the barking dogs in their own communities and find out what their law should say.
Only then will people stop living outside it."' 1 1
B. Extent of Legal Reform
Although de Soto's appeal for legal reform is certainly convincing,
what he does not consider is the extent to which reform must be enacted
and whether such sweeping reforms are feasible. De Soto depicts the Peruvian legal system, for example, as a maze of laws extending in all directions
and supporting all propositions.1 12 Additionally, he underscores that
"[tihe inefficiency of the law courts has given rise to a growing disenchant'1 13
ment with, and loss of confidence in, law-enforcement mechanisms."
Given this complexity and inefficiency, the question arises as to whether
formalizing property rights actually secures rights or simply exposes their
holders to new liabilities (such as taxes). If the government has sanctioned
informality to the extent of allowing informal tribunals and the enforcement of informal property rights, why would people not be drawn to simply complete and strengthen the informal sector? Are the advantages of
formality so great as to outweigh the costs of instituting it (both in economic capital through titling claims and political capital through gaining
their recognition)? De Soto carefully notes that many developing nations'
legal systems have become cluttered with legislation (often passed by the
executive) rendering these formal legal systems ineffective. 1 14 Yet, this
only raises the question as to whether informal economies have organized
their legal systems well enough to not only reform or supplant property
law, but also nearly every other branch of law (including contract law, procedural law, and administrative law)?
C.

Adopting Informality

De Soto believes they have, citing how people form and secure informal expectative property rights under what he terms the "people's law"
110. See id. at 187. "The truth is that lawyers in these countries are generally too
busy studying Western law and adapting it. They have been taught that local practices
are not genuine law but a romantic area of study best left to folklorists. But if lawyers
want to play a role in creating good laws, they must step out of their law libraries into
the extralegal sector, which is the only source of the information they need to build a
truly legitimate formal legal system. By examining the 'people's law' and understanding
its logic, reformers can get a sense of what they need to do to create a self-enforcing legal
system." Id. at 186-87.
111. Id. at 179.
112. See Llosa, supra note 41, at xviii.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at xviii.
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during a gestation period that enables a later transition to formality. Yet,
there is evidence to suggest that the codification of informal rights could
just as easily lead to the institutionalizing of informal rights. Michael Heller, for example, has argued that, close-knit communities may develop
informal norms and institutions to manage resources efficiently. 11 5 In this
sense, while de Soto argues that "[iut is simpler and cheaper to bring the
formals and informals together by changing the law than by trying to
change the characteristics of the people," ' 1 6 he may be missing a crucial
point; namely that it is far cheaper (figuring in transaction costs, the extent
of political, legal, and economic change required) for the people to remain
7
informal in some instances."
D.

Sequencing Property Rights and National Legal Systems

These observations suggest that before property rights can be formalized, initial "expectative" property rights must be created and a legal system must adequately enforce such rights. Therefore, the development of
informal property rights and adequately efficient national legal systems
may be considered to precede formalizing property rights in a forward
linkage.
VIII.

The Linkage between Formalizing Property Rights and
Globalization

Although de Soto wrote The Mystery of Capital in order to illustrate
why many developing nations are unable to participate in global capitalism, he nevertheless ignores the linkage between formalizing property
rights and globalization.
A.

Foreign Investment

Specifically, de Soto fails to address how informal property rights can
serve to protect property interests against foreign investment. Consider,
for example, a developing country that successfully formalizes property
rights according to de Soto's proposal. This implies that illiquid (due to a
lack of title and imperfect market information), informal rights are
replaced by liquid (due to perfect title and perfect market information),
formal rights that can be freely bought and sold on open markets. If these
markets function as efficiently as de Soto maintains they might, 1 18 the
115. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
From Marx to Markets, 111 H~Av. L. REV. 621 (1998).
116. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 187.
117. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 85. Actually, when discussing the organization of the informal economy in Brazil's favelas, de Soto himself
alludes to this possibility when he quotes Donald Stewart's statement that "[in] spite of
the apparent lack of resources, this informal economy functions efficiently. In the favelas there are no rent controls, rents are paid in U.S. dollars and renters who do not pay
are rapidly evicted. The profitability of investment is good and as a result there is an
abundance of supply of housing." Id.
118. See generally id.
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basic question arises as to why the developed world would not intervene
and buy significant amounts of the developing nations' property rights for
themselves? This seems all the more likely when one considers not only
that the developed world could price the developing world out of its own
property market, but also the developed world's relative expertise in con1 19
cluding such transactions on open markets.
Similarly, one must ask whether it can be assumed, for example, that
through simply bestowing formal property rights upon individuals, they
will in turn be able to understand how to leverage these rights so as to raise
capital? Assuming that this is not the case, it seems as if formalizing property rights would work to create a dangerous window where developingworld owners, due to their lack of expertise, would remain unable to raise
capital through financing or when given a new opportunity to raise capital
through selling their property (especially when one considers that the
newly developed market would be larger and generate higher prices than
the owners would have previously encountered).
B. Dual Economies
Globalism also complicates development in that it allows for dualism
to pervade developing countries' economies. While de Soto maintains that
"[what] is understood all too rarely is that the Third World and former
communist societies are experiencing nearly the same industrial revolution
1 20
and that "[tihe
that arrived in the West more than two centuries ago,"'
difference is that this new revolution is roaring ahead much faster and
121
he ignores the fact that
transforming the lives of many more people,"'
development is fundamentally different in today's world. Generally, developing countries include some individuals and industries that are able to
participate in global capitalism, enabling them to live much as the citizens
2
of developed nations do. 1 2 Yet, these individuals and industries nonetheless exist within countries that are, by all accounts, developing.
Furthermore, far from serving as a catalyst for development, these
affluent elements tend to simply render this dualism more intractable, as
the affluent populations' demands often continue to be met through
imports rather than driving domestic investment and fueling domestic
development. 123 In many ways, contemporary dualism within the developing world has, in effect, removed a decisive element of countries' capital
bases, leaving them in a more difficult position than that which previously
faced the developed world. 1 24 In this sense, the developing world often
remains vulnerable to the "development of underdevelopment," whereby it
119. See id. at 212-18.
120. See id. at 70-71.
121. Id. at 71.
122. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 60.

123. See HIRSCHMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 25.
124. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 109. "Only in the Western

nations and small enclaves of wealthy people in developing and former communist
nations have the capacity to represent assets and potential and, therefore, the ability to
produce and use capital efficiently."
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will simply continue a neocolonistsic relation to the developed world. 12 5
C.

Sequencing Property Rights and Globalization

These observations suggest that formalizing property rights precedes
globalization, as property markets will remain localized and rather dormant until clearly delineated property rights are put in place. Therefore
property rights may be seen to precede the globalization of a property market in a forward linkage.
Conclusion
De Soto's work is invaluable in calling attention to the role that formalizing property rights may play in assisting with development, and, in particular, how property rights often precede developments in national
economics and globalization in forward linkages. Yet, by holding property
rights as the key to progress rather than simply a factor in development, he
exaggerates their true importance, ignoring how the formalizing of property rights is generally preceded by national politics, national culture, and
national legal systems in forward linkages, and evidence that property
rights can only be formalized when numerous other factors are present.
In this sense, before de Soto's program of instituting formal property
rights can truly further development, he will have to address the more basic
questions raised by Joseph Singer in his introduction to Entitlement.126

After noting the political implications of property, Singer states, "the property problem goes beyond deciding whether to recognize particular property rights, or when to limit them; rather it forces on us more urgent
questions: What shall property be? What shall it mean? What kind of
property regime should we construct?" 12 7 Then, and only then, will de
Soto's model have a chance of delivering on its promises of development
and progress, and separate itself from the progression of one-factor theories that have come before it.

125. See Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, MONTHLY
17-31 (1966).
126. JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000).
127. Id. at 9.
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